Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Consciousness, philosophy: The experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also intentionality, identity theory, other minds.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
II Güven Güzeldere Ist Bewusstsein die Wahrnehmung dessen, was im Geist vorgeht? In Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
II 397f
Consciousness of mental states: "perceptual-like": Locke, Armstrong, Paul and Patricia Churchland, Lycan
"Thought-like": Rosenthal, Carruthers, Dennett, also Descartes.
II 404
Awareness/Locke/Churchland/Armstrong/Lycan: speaking of "scanning" or "monitoring".
Question: What is perceived, the content, or the state itself?
II 411
Consciousness/Churchland: introspective awareness is a subspecies of perception.
Thesis: In the language of a mature neuroscience, there might be a more differentiated representation of "human subjective consciousness".
E.g. Dopamine level could be interpreted as Gm7 chords in music.
We need to learn this conceptual system and practice its application. (Davidson's conceptual scheme).
Güzeldere: Churchland is thus not only convinced that mental states are identical with brain states, but also that their properties are identical.
IIb Patricia Smith Churchland Die Neurobiologie des Bewusstseins - Was können wir von ihr lernen? In Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
II 475
Consciousness/Dennett: is a virtual machine. Thesis: People become aware of the extent to which they acquire language and learn to talk about themselves. In this transition, a parallel machine (the neural networks in the brain) simulates a serial machine (which performs the operations step by step on the basis of rules that can be recursive).
Dennett: Consciousness behaves like the flight simulator to the processes within the computer.
II 476
1. The assumption of the language dependence of consciousness denies children and animals consciousness.
II 477
2. It has been known for some time that recurrent neural networks can produce temporal sequencing.
3. No virtual machine is required, a particular class of operations can be the output of a single, if heavily distributed, network.
Dennett could be quite right, but not on this way.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-22