|Attribution: statements that provide an object with properties are attributions. See also self-ascription, predication._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Frank I 640
Freud/Unconscious/Self-attribution/first person/Davidson: Freud shows by expanding the concepts of intention, belief, desire, etc., that they encompass the unconscious. In fact, that the subject loses the immediate authority over some of their propositional attitudes.
In fact, the loss of this authority is the criterion for unconscious mental states.
Psychoanalysis/Davidson: even more interesting is the fact that the regaining of authority is the only indication that the attitude was already present before it was acknowledged by its owner in a non-concluding way.
Unconscious/Davison: I do not think that the existence of unconscious attitudes jeopardizes the importance of the authority of the first person.
Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984),
101-111_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994