|Kripke's Wittgenstein: Interpretation by Saul A. Kripke of a problem by L. Wittgenstein in connection with the rule series. Kripke extends Wittgenstein's doubts about the security with which we judge our own opinion. If we only believe to follow rules, we do not know for sure what we mean by addition. From a finite series of cases in the past, no certainty about future cases can be gained. The core of the problem is, according to Kripke, that there are no facts that determine the importance of our own beliefs._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Esfeld I 102
Disposition/Rule/Rule Sequencenes/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Esfeld:
KripkeVsDispositions: (1982): they do not help because they are also limited. Nor can they solve the problem of normativity: why would the action that one has to dispose to do, the one that one should do if one were to follow the rule? No distinction correct/incorrect.
Kripke: is here further than Quine, who is limited to the behavior (in Word and Object, explicitly referring to Wittgenstein).
Meaning/content: assuming that they are Platonic objects, one only shifts the problem: How can a person grasp these senses? What makes it that a finite sequence of mental acts capture the right meaning? (e.g. addition).
Katz: suggests that such Platonic objects (Fregean senses) are themselves finite.
VsKatz: any finite sequence can express more than one such sense. What distinguishes the comprehension of addition from the comprehension of quaddition?_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002