﻿ Jerold J. Katz on Analysis - Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

# Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Analysis: examining a subject by breaking it down into its components.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Cresswell I 21
Lexical decomposition/analysis/Katz/word meaning/list/Cresswell: (Katz 1972, p. 49). Example: "Chair":

(10) (object), (physical), (non-alive), (artifact), (furniture), (portable), (something with legs), (something with a back), (something with a sitting space), (seat for one).

Problem: Katz declines to say what, e.g. an (object) is.
N.B.: even in recent times (Harrison 1974, 601 ff), we find this "object" as an English word (!) ((s) i.e. not perceived) as a physical object.)
Cresswell: that's all right, as long as we consider e.g. (seat for one) to be sufficiently similar to an electron in a physical theory.
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I 32
CresswellVsKatz: we simply have no idea what the most basic entities of his decomposition should be. On the other hand, we have an idea of it in the semantics of possible worlds.
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I 21
Semantics of possible worlds/word meaning/CresswellVsKatz: Example "chair": a function , so that for each world w and thing a, w ε ω (a) iff. a is a chair in w. See below I 51: omega/ω: evaluation of the predicate, w: possible world. ((s) ε ω (a)": the world w is an element of the set of the worlds in which this object is a chair "/" ω (a)": the function ω makes the object "ω(a)") from this object.
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I 32
Problem: this is not quite accurate: just as there is a reference to different worlds, there should also be one to different moments, where something is in one moment a chair, but not in another.
Context dependence/Cresswell: is taken into account both in the semantics of possible worlds (Cresswell 1973, 180) and in the Katz/Fodor semantics. (Katz, 1972, 303ff). Circularity is only apparent here: if I use "chair" in my meta-language, I have, of course, presupposed the knowledge of the reader of this meta-language. So that the way in which the set of worlds where x is a chair was presented, the word "chair" was used.
Katz/Fodor semantics/semantics of possible worlds/Cresswell: one can connect both: e.g. "chair": we would not treat "chair" as a single symbol whose meaning is w, but as a complex expression of the form
(x is an object) & ... & (x is a seat for one).

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Katz I
Jerrold J. Katz
"The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974

Katz II
Jerrold J. Katz
Jerry Fodor
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Katz III
Jerrold J. Katz
Jerry Fodor
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Katz V
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

> Counter arguments against Katz
> Counter arguments in relation to Analysis

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-07-21