Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Schwarz I 42
Van InwagenVsModal Realism/InwagenVsLewis: "concretism". Stalnaker: "extreme modal realism".
Schwarz I 64
Modal Realism/Possible Worlds/VsLewis/Schwarz: some: Lewis' possible worlds would have to be part of reality because "actuality", "world" and "reality" are synonymous terms for the totality of all things.(Plantinga 1976, 256f Lycan 1979, 290): the idea of real things outside the world is simply inconsistent.
Reality/World/LewisVsVs: Lewis distinguishes between world and reality: "actual world" means only a small part of all things (reality includes world, world only part of reality). This resolves the contradictions.
Schwarz: this is a neutral formulation of modal realism. Question: what does the reality of space-time maximal objects deal with modality?
Modality/van InwagenVsLewis/Schwarz: here it is about how our world could have been, not about how any of us isolated things are. (1885, 119,1986, 226), Plantinga 1987).
LewisVsVs: modal operators are just quantifiers about such things.
Van InwagenVsLewis: the objection goes deeper: e.g. there are exactly 183 space-time maximal objects. This is not analytically wrong. There is also no rigid designator.
Schwarz I 65
It could be true or not. Lewis appears to assert that there are as many space-time objects as there are sets.
VsLewis: thus the totality of the worlds has become contingent!

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Inwa I
Peter van Inwagen
Metaphysics Fourth Edition

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-08-23