|Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Schwarz I 32
Properties/some authors: surely not all properties are relational like "to be remote" - but could they not be time-relational at all, while ignoring this constant dependency? (Haslanger 1989(1):123f, Jackson 1994b(2),142f, van Inwagen 1990a(3), 116).
1. Sally Haslanger : “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125
2. Frank Jackson [1994a]: “Armchair Metaphysics”. In John O’Leary Hawthorne und Michaelis Michael
(ed.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 23–42.
3. Peter van Inwagen [1990a]: “Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001]_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Peter van Inwagen
Metaphysics Fourth Edition
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005