Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Intensional Logic: intensional logic is a logic that goes beyond the examination of the possibilities of linking fixed (extensional) statements. Problems occur in the context of meaning shifts of intensions (statements that are relativized to speakers and situations). A central problem is the impossibility of quantifying into intensional contexts, that is, e.g. to conclude from a dream the existence of the dreamed content. The treatment of possibility and necessity also belongs to the intensional logic. See also modal logic, possible worlds, semantics of possible worlds, intensions, propositions, opacity, possibility, necessity.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 11
Intensional Logic/Non-Standard/Hintikka: intensional logic uses non-standard semantics (i.e., the individual domain is not fixed.). Therefore, it is not necessary to limit the domain of possible worlds of their framework. It would also be inappropriate for other reasons:
Epistemic logic: here the restriction would mean that everyone knows the identity of all individuals in the possible world. This would lead to omniscience.
Problem: this would make the situation even stranger: there must then often be epistemic alternatives to the world w0, which are not alethischen (logical) alternatives! This contradicts the natural assumption that:
Logical possibility forms the broadest class of possibilities.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Hin I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Hintikka

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

> Export as BibTeX Datei
Legal Notice & Contact   Data protection declaration

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-05-27