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|Prior I 121
Objects of thought/Brentano/Meinong/Findlay: Brentano: is a modern echo of Reid:
Brentano: Scholasticism called the intentional existence of an object a "direction (pointing) to an object" (this does not have to be something real) or "an immanent objectivity".
Mental state/Brentano: everyone has in himself something that serves as an object, even if not all do this in the same way.
Brentano's modern echo is Findlay.
Intentional objects/thought objects/Findlay: (like Meinong): we can think of objects that do not exist.
We can even make many true claims about them.
Meinong: e.g. that the golden mountain does not exist is true but it is undoubtedly that it is both a mountain and a golden one.
(s) VsMeinong: E.g. just as an impossible thing is both: 1. impossible, 2. a thing. Findlay/Meinong: existence or non-existence does not make any difference in reference to "being what".
Non-existence/Meinong: "incomplete objects" that lie before us, whenever we think of them, in the general way "something that is so and so" (Similar to Reid:> triangle).
Prior I 123
Intentionality/Brentano: unique logical category. Similar to a relation, without being a real relation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014
Objects of thought Oxford 1971
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003