Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Attribution: statements that provide an object with properties are attributions. See also self-ascription, predication.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Attribution of believe/Boer: known problem: that the logical equivalence fails here.
Problem: if the words in P are replaced by others.
Notation/Terminology/Boer: "≡" is the truth-functional analog of "if and only if" (iff).
"Bel (A, p)": "A believes that p".
I 21
Attribution of believe/Intentionality/Boer: Question:
A) is believe intentional?
B) is attribution of believe intentional?
Quine/Boer: his semantic rise has caused the second question to conceal the first.
Definition Intensionality/(sic, with s)/Boer: is nowadays negative, defined as non-intensionality.
So we need a definition of "extensional sentence".
Denotation/denoting/Boer: Assuming, denotating terms are: names, indices, demonstrativa and mass terms.
Definition English +/Boer: be an extension of English by zero or more denotating expressions and predicates.
I 22
Definition extensional reading/Boer: (provisional): E.g.: "A thing x is such that ... x ..." is unambiguous, then it is an extensional reading S iff it fulfills the following extensional principles:
Definition: a strong principle of existential generalization/extensibility/Boer: for a denotating term D and variable v which does not belong to S if S has the form [... D ...], then one can conclude from S validly [an existing thing v is such that ... v ...].
Definition: replacement princinple for co-extensive predicates/Boer: ... from [for objects x1, ... xn, either P (x1, ... xn) or Q(x1, ... xn) or neither P nor Q] we can exclude any theorem which is obtained by replacing one or more occurrences of P in S by Q.
Definition replacement princinple for materialistic equivalent sentences/Boer: for every sentence P and Q in English +, if P is present in S, one can deduce from S and [Either P and Q, or neither P nor Q] every sentence which is formed by the replacement of one or several occurrences of P in S by Q.
Definition of the substitutionality of the identity/Boer: for each denotating term D and E of English +: if S has the form [... D ...], one can deduce from S and an equation of the form [D = E] (or [E = D] every sentence which is formed by replacing one or more occurrences of D by E in S.
I 22
Validity/everyday language/Boer: can only be asserted relatively to a particular reading.
English +/Boer: we need that to exclude the fact that the four principles are not trivially fulfilled by there being no counterexamples to the inferences in question simply because there are not enough names or predicates to formulate one.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-06-26
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