Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Representation, philosophy: representations are adopted internal conditions, such as visual imaginations or linguistic completions, which set in as associations or are possibly developed by reconstruction. In a wider sense, sentences, words, and symbols are representations within a character system. See also truth maker, idea, sentences, propositions, intensions, correspondence, speech act theory.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
I 16
Representation/conceptual dependency/non-actualism/referential quantification/Boer: the referential quantification does not work so easy here.
Representation/Solution/Boer: there is a completely intelligible property which can have a real relation: the representation:

(CD) R is a concept-dependent relation = it is possible that for some objects x and y and properties F and G, x R to y, qua has the thing that is F, but x has R not to y qua the thing, which is G.

(CD)) says that the speech of x relation to y qua F-thing ((s) x is the same F as y): namely, x's representation of y.
Conceptual relation: could then be mediated by representations in the sense that to be in relation R to y, x be behavioristic to the intrinsic properties of a (verbal or non-verbal) representation which in its turn is associated with y in the correct manner
Thought object: here it can be a kind of "presentation". (E.g. souvenir image, causally based on y, a private name or label).

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986


> Counter arguments against Boer
> Counter arguments in relation to Representation



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-25