|Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Identity/Boer: well-known individuals, characteristics and relations seem to have "identities" in the sense that there is something that makes them what they are. ((s) identity as a "set of (typical) properties").
Solution/Boer: then we could link actuality/existence with identity:
(E!) A being is existing/actual iff an essential property is exemplified by him.
Non-actual/non-existent: here there are two possibilities then:
A) an essential property of N is not exemplified (e.g. fictional figures, "merely possible individuals" e.g. Superman)> Possibilism, also Plantinga as an actualist pro)
(B) N has no essential properties. For example, it is assumed that fictional characters are essentially fictional, that is, they could not be real. Then there might be at best an imitation of Superman. The fictional Superman is then a thing without individual essence. ().
If one accepts this, one can still maintain the thesis that all things are necessarily self-identical._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986