|Actualism: in relation to worlds the thesis that only our own world is real. - Counter-position essentialism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Definition Actuality/Existence/Being/Frege/Russell/Quine/Boer: Thesis: There is no distinction between existence and being. (> Non-existence, non-existencing). That is, there are no non-existent things.
Nominalism is, of course, an actualism.
Tolerant actualism/Boer: admits, e.g. that there are non-actual states. E.g. causally not effective non-concreted individuals. For example, non-exemplified properties.
Intentional relation/tolerant actualism: allows that it is only possible that we participate in such relations. Principle (DI):
(DI) Definition "X participates/participation in the world": If X is an individual, then it exists localized in the space time, if X is a proposition, it exists and is true. If X is a state, it exists and persists. If X is a property or relation, then it exists and is exemplified. If X is an event, then it exists and X occurs.
Non-actuality/Boer: would say that non-existent things can no longer participate in the world, as unexamplified properties.
Therefore (DI) can be accepted by actualists as well as by non-actualists.
Scientific Camp: Plantinga: (1974) is a liberal actualist without nominalist scruples - also allows properties, relation and propositions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986