|Actual: in relation to the real world as opposed to a merely possible world or situation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Actuality/Boer: (= existence) against it: being unequals existence.
Note I 36
Question: Does acquaintance with the object and the property shifts one into another physical state?
A) if intentional states are locally supervening on non-intentional facts about the person, then not.
B) if they supervise globally, then yes.
> "There is".
Non-actual essences/non-updated essential properties/Boer: their possibility does not bind us to non-actual individuals whose essences they would be.
Plantinga: Thesis: the former make the latter superfluous: Boer pro: that could be.
E.g. there is no obligation on a round square, but the non-exemplifiable property of being a round square._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986