|Artificial Consciousness: in the philosophical discussion about artificial consciousness, the question is whether non-living systems can acquire a set of distinctions that allow a “knowledge-how”. This is meant to be an experiencing of qualities, which can lead to novel decisions. In contrast, the (artificial) intelligence in the narrower sense is the ability to solve problems. See also artificial intelligence, strong artificial intelligence, consciousness, self-consciousness, connectionism, qualia, knowledge-how._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Metzinger II 719
Consciousness/Machine/Birnbacher: why should one not "be able to say" that a machine has consciousness?
That a chair "thinks" would simply be empty due to a lack of empirical criteria.
Concept/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: Wittgenstein attributes the attribution criteria of a thing, to the concept of the thing, therefore he has an extended concept of the term.
For example, the concept of pain is characterized not only by what pain in itself is, but also by its specific function in our lives.
Consciousness/Machine/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: it follows that for Wittgenstein an artificial consciousness is logically impossible, since in our linguistic usage we only attribute it to humans. We would have no conditions according to which we would describe the behavior of machines as conscious. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 360)
The conditions of truth may be fulfilled, but the conditions of assertiveness may never be fulfilled.
I.e. even if it were true that the machine had consciousness, it would be conceptually impossible for us to claim it, because our concept of consciousness would not fit on it.
The factually valid criteria are made for the factually applicable and not for any conceivable application situations.
Consciousness/Machine/Nomological Impossibility/Julian Huxley: in a BBC broadcast: "real" emotions and intentions are only possible in biotic matter.
Also Paul Ziff, end of the 50s.
Zombie/Robot/"Imitation Man"/Birnbacher: current discussion (early nineties): Phenomena of consciousness occur when a certain threshold of activation rate is exceeded.
An "imitation man" might not feel anything, but he might think, mean, or expect something. (Intention). He could also think of himself, without actual self-consciousness.
Consciousness/Man/Birnbacher: the nomological conditions for human consciousness are not only necessary, but also sufficient. I.e. they force consciousness in humans!
Criteria/Consciousness/Human/Wittgenstein: behaviour as a criterion for attributing consciousness.
Consciousness/Machine/Birnbacher: behaviour cannot be a criterion for attributing consciousness to machines. Here neurophysiological criteria are important, which Wittgenstein attributes to the symptoms.
Consciousness/Behaviour/Animals/Rollin/BirnbacherVsWittgenstein: even in animals, behaviour is an unreliable criterion for consciousness!
For example, cows eat immediately after an operation. Reason: their food is so low in nutrients that they would be weakened too much if they took long breaks. Longer periods of fasting are possible in humans._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Analytische Einführung in die Ethik Berlin 2013
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996