Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Sufficiency: The reason for an action or the reason for a conclusion is sufficient if no further conditions are necessary. However, this does not mean that the consequences must also occur, since obstacles or physical hindrances have not yet been taken into account. See also ceteris paribus, necessity.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 270
Conditions/Causation/Cause/Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore, we will not treat necessary and sufficient conditions separately, but assume a general modal relation between cause and effect. It is this theory that we reject.
Conditions/sufficient/necessary/causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: general problem: corresponding theories are too strongly linked to a determinism of nature.
Determinism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is meant here only in the broader sense.
VsDeterminism/Bigelow/Pargetter: it would follow that there is no effect without sufficient conditions. And that would mean that we would have to give up the concept of causation to the extent that indeterminism exists.
Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the macroscopic world, however, we do not have to give it up at all.
Causes/Bigelow/Pargetter: are not conditions.
Cause/Probability/Bigelow/Pargetter: representatives of causes as conditions could weaken their thesis and speak of probability instead of sufficient conditions.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Bigelow

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-21