|Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Rainer Stuhlmann-Laeisz on Beliefs - Dictionary of Arguments
Stuhlmann-Laeisz I 99
corresponds to the belief that something is necessary - not to the belief that something is possible.
Logic of belief/epistemic logic/Stuhlmann-Laeisz: knowledge logic: unlike belief logic: Model: additional relation S (reflexive, transitive, symmetric) - U = is a Model, if
(i) U" = is a SGL-Modell.
(ii) S is a reflexive relation pon K and
(iii) for all j,k from K: if jRk then jSk - corresponds to S5.
Epistemic logic: every statement of GAL is also a statement of GAL + W._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
R. Stuhlmann Laeisz
Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002
Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995