|Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Kim Sterelny on Beliefs - Dictionary of Arguments
Thoughts/beliefs/animal/Sterelny: Mind readers, according to an argumentation line, master something like an everyday psychology.
Heyes adapts this: a living being with a theory of the mind believes that mental states play a causal role in the generation of behavior.
Concept/Sterelny: when one binds the possession of concepts to the inferential connections between them, one gets to this point of view: the "inferential roles theory of meaning".
When I respond to the "Tiger" alarm call,...
...I have a "little knowledge of tigers".
To have a concept of belief is to have a belief theory in this theory.
Concept/SterelnyVs: it is not compulsory to make concepts dependent on internal relationships,
they can also be identified by their relationships with the outside world._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
"Primate Worlds", in: The Evolution of Cognition, C. Heyes/L. Huber (Eds.) Cambridge/MA 2000
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005
Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest Cambridge/UK 2007