|Consciousness, philosophy: The experience of differences along with a freedom of choice as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also intentionality, identity theory, other minds.|
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|Kim Sterelny Primatenwelten in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg.) Der Geist der Tiere, Frankfurt 2005
Perler I 378
Mind/Animal/Consciousness/Representation/Sterelny: what would show that an animal has a "theory of mind"?
Heyes/Whiten: Maybe the ability for a role exchange? Later Vs.
Premack/Woodruff: E.g. Chimpanzee Sarah sorted out photos that showed the solution of problems!
HeyesVs: every single case can be clarified.
Method/Heyes/Sterelny: however, it is little economical to "explain away" every single performance. One can see that there is no uniform "spoilsport theory".
Gorillas/Byrnes: gorillas do not learn by learning individual "chunks" of movement, but they capture a behavioral program.
Imitation/Sterelny: although there is a lot of anecdotal evidence about imitation in human beings, the experimental evidence for imitation is astonishingly narrow.
But in the positive cases, it is impressive because it shows the ability of an observer to extract a program of motoric movements.
HeyesVs: it doubts that the concept of a behavioral program is unclear. Delimitation to a series of movements or behavioral sequences are not clear.
Sterelny: but we should be able to distinguish something empirically:
1. If social learning consists in imprecisely imitating, different individuals should not commit the same errors. The errors would have to happen at random.
2. Imitation could be distinguished from other types of social learning if a result could be achieved in more than one way. If a model is needed, it should not only contain something about the objectives but also about the means.
D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg)
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005