|Consciousness, philosophy: The experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also intentionality, identity theory, other minds._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Mind/Animal/Consciousness/Representation/Sterelny: what would show that an animal has a "theory of mind"?
Heyes/Whiten: Maybe the ability for a role exchange? Later Vs.
Premack/Woodruff: E.g. Chimpanzee Sarah sorted out photos that showed the solution of problems!
HeyesVs: every single case can be clarified.
Method/Heyes/Sterelny: however, it is little economical to "explain away" every single performance. One can see that there is no uniform "spoilsport theory".
Gorillas/Byrnes: gorillas do not learn by learning individual "chunks" of movement, but they capture a behavioral program.
Imitation/Sterelny: although there is a lot of anecdotal evidence about imitation in human beings, the experimental evidence for imitation is astonishingly narrow.
But in the positive cases, it is impressive because it shows the ability of an observer to extract a program of motoric movements.
HeyesVs: it doubts that the concept of a behavioral program is unclear. Delimitation to a series of movements or behavioral sequences are not clear.
Sterelny: but we should be able to distinguish something empirically:
1. If social learning consists in imprecisely imitating, different individuals should not commit the same errors. The errors would have to happen at random.
2. Imitation could be distinguished from other types of social learning if a result could be achieved in more than one way. If a model is needed, it should not only contain something about the objectives but also about the means._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
"Primate Worlds", in: The Evolution of Cognition, C. Heyes/L. Huber (Eds.) Cambridge/MA 2000
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005
Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest Cambridge/UK 2007