|Kripke's Wittgenstein: Interpretation by Saul A. Kripke of a problem by L. Wittgenstein in connection with the rule series. Kripke extends Wittgenstein's doubts about the security with which we judge our own opinion. If we only believe to follow rules, we do not know for sure what we mean by addition. From a finite series of cases in the past, no certainty about future cases can be gained. The core of the problem is, according to Kripke, that there are no facts that determine the importance of our own beliefs._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Stegmüller IV 15
Skeptical Solution/Kripke's Wittgenstein/KW/Kripkenstein/Stegmüller: Reference to common terminology and rule sequences instead of "facts" and truth conditions.
"Bizarre Skepticism" KW/Stegmüller: Example "Quus": in additions of larger numbers 7 could always come out, only that such numbers have never been added in the past - therefore we ourselves do not know whether we apply the addition or the "Quaddition" - so far only finitely many cases have been followed - an extension to infinitely many cases allows infinitely many different interpretations of the previous practice, which explain the previous cases, but predict deviations for the future - N.B.: then in the past I meant something different than I thought I meant.
Kripke's Wittgenstein: wrong solutions: 1. "Do what you did in the past": that's what he does! - 2. algorithm (calculation method): one must have learned this somehow! - I just cannot know that in the past I meant the "standard interpretation" 3. Exclusion of wrong rules: could only be done by further rules: Return of the old problem.
N.B.: that the current use is the right one is not doubted at all!
Kripke's Wittgenstein/Disposition/KripkeVsRyle: the crucial dispositions were acquired in the past - the difference already existed in the past - KripkeVsRyle: 1. Dispositions are irrelevant at all - a) If I have a hypothesis about my dispositions, I still do not know if it is the right one instead of another.
b) If we wanted to let "the past rest" and just ask what seems right to me now, we lose the term "right".
Kripke: N.B.: I have always had the same dispositions!
Kripke's Wittgenstein/KripkeVsDisposition Theory: If one understands mine in such a way that what I mean now determines what I should mean in the future, then that is normative, not descriptive.
IV 50 KW: no fact: even an "omniscient being" could not know what we mean - the fact of thinking does not exist.
Kripke's Wittgenstein/VsIntrospection/Stegmüller: two people can agree completely in their inner experiences, and yet one can mean "plus" and the other "Quus" - experience content: can also tell us nothing about the treatment of new cases - grasping a meaning is not an experience.
Example experience: the beginner has another than the advanced one, e.g. when reading aloud - but: the feeling "I can read" is not a sufficient condition for real reading.
Kripke's Wittgenstein: for Platonism, facts exist, yet problem of access to these entities: not clear whether I grasp the right sense.
See also >Private Language, >Rule Following._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989