Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Content: content is that part of a statement, which can be expressed by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content. See also Semantic content, Conceptual content, Mental content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gerhard Schurz on Content - Dictionary of Arguments
I 23 Content/Schurz: A proposition is the more substantial, the more consequences it has. Probability and content of hypotheses are often opposite. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Theories, >Probability, >Truth. I 89 Content/stronger/weaker: The content strength decreases during the transition from all-phrases via singular phrases to existential phrases. E.g. A universal sentence (x)Fx is logically stronger than its singular Fa instances and these are stronger than the corresponding existential sentence (Ex)Fx). >Stronger/weaker, >Generalization/Schurz, >Falsification/Schurz. I 97 Def Logical Content/Schurz: the logical content of a proposition (or set of propositions) S is the set of all propositions or consequences logically following from S. Def Empirical Content/Schurz: only the set of empirical (and thus verifiable) propositions or consequences logically following from S, which are not already analytically true. Def Observational content/Schurz: is even narrower than empirical content: only the observational propositions that follow from S. This notion has very limited applicability: Only for purely universal law hypotheses. Observation proposition/Schurz: no observation propositions follow from an allexistence hypothesis Ex H:= (x)(Fx > (Ey)(Gxy). Schurz: From H follows by universal instantiation only Fa > Gay and this is no observation theorem, because (Ey)Gay is a spatiotemporally restricted existence theorem. Such allexistence hypotheses are therefore also not falsifiable. However, they are confirmable. But this is weaker than falsifiable. >Observation, >Observation sentences. Def Probabilistic content/statistics/probability/Schurz: Let S be a set of statistical hypotheses, this logically does not imply any observational propositions, but at best gives them a belief probability. Wrong: to assume that the content would be the set of propositions with a certain minimum probability. Because this set can be contradictory! Even if r is still so close to 1. Conjunction probability: the conjunction of many highly probable sentences can be very improbable on their part! Solution/Schurz: probabilistic content is the set of all probability propositions which follow from S according to the axioms of probability. >Probability, >Subjective propability. I 109 Def relevant content/relevance/logic/Schurz: (a) the relevant logical content of a proposition or set of propositions S is the set of its relevant consequence elements. Notation: Cr(S) b) the relevant empirical content of S is the set of those relevant consequence elements of S that are empirical and not analytic true propositions. Notation: Er(S). Each set of sentences is L equivalent to the set of its relevant consequence elements. >Relevance/Schurz._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19