Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Kripke's Wittgenstein: Interpretation by Saul A. Kripke of a problem by L. Wittgenstein in connection with the rule series. Kripke extends Wittgenstein's doubts about the security with which we judge our own opinion. If we only believe to follow rules, we do not know for sure what we mean by addition. From a finite series of cases in the past, no certainty about future cases can be gained. The core of the problem is, according to Kripke, that there are no facts that determine the importance of our own beliefs.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
Sch I 160
Kripke s Wittgenstein / SchulteVsKripke: the paradox arises because one could interpret a signpost in virtually any direction. - VsKripke: error to assume that there is an interpretation here at all - instead: training: drawing no conclusions between the seeing of the sign and the reaction - solution: act as part of a practice.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Sch I
J. Schulte
Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001

Sch II
J. Schulte/U.J. Wenzel
Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001


> Counter arguments in relation to Kripke’s Wittgenstein



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-28