Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Reason, philosophy: reason (German “Vernunft”, prudence) is the ability to get insight. The concept of reason in this sense is distinguished in the German Idealism from the concept of reason in the sense of “Verstand” (subtlety), whereby the latter refers to the recognition of regularities and differences and the former refers to the justification of principles which are the basis of the regularities. See also mind, spirit, idealism.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Korfmacher Schopenhauer zur Einführung Hamburg 1994
I 28
Principle of sufficient reason/Schopenhauer: fourfold root: the four classes of ideas accordingly.
1 empirically: causality, reason of becoming
2 The terms corresponding to: the basis of knowledge, justification of judgments
3 the a priori forms of space and time according to: location, sequence in time, by pure sensuality, ground of being
4 Law of motivation, which corresponds to the subject of the will, reason for action.
- - -
I 25
Mind (Verstand)/Schopenhauer: has only one object - Reason (Vernunft): merges objects.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-08-19
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