Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Intuitionism: A) intuitionism in mathematics assumes that the objects to be inspected, e.g. numbers are only constructed in the process of the investigation and are therefore not ready objects, which are discovered. This has an effect on the double negation and the sentence of the excluded middle.
B) Intuitionism of ethics assumes that moral principles are fixed and are immediately (or intuitively) knowable.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 31
Intuitionism/Rawls: we should see it as a kind of pluralism. In doing so, we have to weigh up principles intuitively. Intuitionists are concerned with different dimensions, be it taxes, wages, penalties.
I 32
These different dimensions give rise to different socio-political objectives, which must be weighed up against each other, for example with regard to an effective tax system, full employment, gross domestic product, and so on. Intuitionism creates a basis for deciding to what extent the commandments of one group must be adapted to those of another group.
There are two principles: 1. principle of benefit: we should produce as much as possible. 2. principle of justice: Accumulate wealth and balance inequalities.
This concept is intuitive in that it is now a matter of weighing these principles against each other.
I 34
Justice: Intuitionism claims that the emphasis is not based on an explicit ethical conception. There would be no moral criteria here. In the end, we have a number of first principles about which we can only say that it seems to us to be more correct to balance them in this way than in another.
RawlsVsIntuitionism: if we want to refute it, we must identify constructive ethical criteria for these weightings, which supposedly do not exist.
I 35
Intuitionism/Rawls: there are teleological (Moore (Principia Ethica, pp. 27-31), >perfectionism) and deontological (Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 21-27) variants of intuitionism.
I 39
Intuitionism is not intrinsically irrational when it says that there is a plurality of first principles at the end. He insists, however, that an attempt to get behind these principles either reduces them to the triviality, that everyone is provided with duties or to an incorrect simplification if everything is traced back to a benefit.
I 41
Intuitionism/justice/Rawls: undoubtedly, any conception of justice will have to rely to some extent on intuition. In order to allow a rational discussion of principles, however, we must reduce this intuition to a minimum.
I 42
A. In the initial position for the establishment of a society, the weighting of principles must be discussed between the individual members. These will aim for a different weighting of their own accord.
B. Another possibility is the lexical order for the execution of principles in an order to be chosen.
I 43
The sequence itself is simply serial and avoids having to weigh the principles against each other from the very beginning. See Principles/Rawls.
Problem: in a lexical order.
I 44
Dependence on intuition can be minimized by dealing with rational questions rather than moral ones. For example, it can be too abstract to weigh total benefit against total equality.
Justice as Fairness/Rawls: this is where intuition comes into play in two ways: 1. we choose a social position to deal with, 2. we ask from the point of view of a person who is supposed to hold that position, whether it is rational to prefer this arrangement.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-06-03
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