Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Intentionality: intentionality is the ability of people and higher animals to relate to and react to circumstances such as things and states. Concepts, words, and sentences also refer to something but have no intentionality. This linguistic relating-to is called reference instead.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
 
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Books on Amazon
Joelle Proust Das intentionale Tier in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005

Perler I 233
Animal/Mind/Intentionality/Premack/Woodruff/Proust: Premack/Woodruff's famous studies of "Theory of the Mind" in animals, "beliefs and desires", etc.
Proust: if one speaks of a theory of the mind, one should distinguish it from a social one not from a psychological competence in the strict sense by which social animals try to influence each other.

Premack: an animal can deliberately act on what another is doing (social) or thinks (then also psychologically).
"Spoilsport version": the explanation of behavior: not intention but only established correlation is intended to explain the behavior of an animal.
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I 234
Then the psychological side can be dispensed with. Speechless animals simply establish a correlation.
DennettVs: intentional attitude for explanation.
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I 234
Intentionality/Dennett: Levels:
1. Desires and beliefs can be attributed.
2. Beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires
3. Beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires of the second level, etc.
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I 235
ProustVsDennett: opens the door for the human to apply his psychological concepts to apparently concept-less processes: cars, dogs, cats.
It is slightly different with primates.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Tie I
D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg)
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-28