Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Correctness, Logik: is a property of systems or calculi, not of conclusions. A system is correct when all the statements provable in it are true. The system is complete when all valid statements in it are also provable. Completeness and correctness are complementary; they are complementing each other to adequacy. (R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Philosophische Logik, Paderborn, 2002).
B. Correctness, accuracy, philosophy contrary to the concept of truth, the concept of accuracy refers to an implicitly or explicitly presupposed rule system, which is fulfilled or not fulfilled. While truth is something that is attributed or denied to sentences, accuracy is rather applied to actions - also verbal acting - as well as to illustrations. Unlike truth, accuracy allows gradations. See also truth, truth conditions, indeterminacy, systems, theory, fulfillment, satisfiability._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Plato on Correctness - Dictionary of Arguments
Gadamer I 350 Correctness/Truth/Formalism/Sophistry/Plato/Gadamer: [Plato has] clearly seen (...) that there is no criterion that is sufficient for argumentation, by which truly philosophical use of speech can be distinguished from sophistic use. In particular, he shows in Letter 7 that the formal refutability of a thesis does not necessarily exclude its truth.(1) Cf. >Reflection/Gadamer, >Reflection/Hegel, >Sophists/Plato. Gadamer I 412 Correctness/Word/Language/Thinking/Plato/Gadamer: If one (...) sees (...) the dispute about the "correctness of names" as it is settled by "Cratylos"(2-4), then the theories under discussion there (>Word/Plato, >Names/Plato, >Language/Plato) suddenly gain an interest that goes beyond Plato and his own intention. For both theories, which the Platonic Socrates brings to failure, are not weighed in their full truth weight. A. Conventionalist theory attributes that of words to a naming, a baptism of things in a name, as it were. ((s) Cf. today's >Causal theory of names.) For this theory, the name apparently does not claim any objective knowledge - and now Socrates convicts the advocate of this sober view by allowing him or her, from the difference between the true and the false Logos, to admit the components of the Logos, the words (onomata), as true or false, and also the naming as a part of speaking to refer to the discovery of being (ousia) happening in speaking(4). Gadamer I 413 This is such an assertion that is so incompatible with the conventionalist thesis that it is easy to infer from there, conversely, that the true name and the correct naming is decisive. Socrates himself admits that the understanding of the name thus obtained leads to an etymological intoxication and to the most absurd consequences (...). B. Similarity Theory: (...) its discussion [adheres] entirely within the preconditions of "natural theory", namely to the principle of similarity, and resolves the same only by gradual restriction. For if the "correctness" of names should really be based on the correct, i.e. appropriate, naming of things, even then, as with every such measurement, there are still degrees and gradations of correctness. Now, if only that little bit of rightness still reflects the outline (typos) of the thing in itself, it may be good enough to be useful.(6) But you have to be even more far-reaching. A word can also be understood, obviously out of habit and agreement, if it contains sounds that are not at all similar to the thing - so that the whole principle of similarity is shaken and refuted by examples such as the words for numbers. There, no similarity can be allowed at all, because numbers do not belong to the visible and moving world, so that for them the principle of agreement obviously applies alone. Solution/Plato: The convention, which is presented in practical language and which alone determines the correctness of the words, may make use of the principle of similarity wherever possible, but it is not bound by it.(7) Recognition/Language/Words/Plato: This is a very moderate point of view, but it includes the fundamental premise that words have no real cognitive meaning - a result that points beyond the whole sphere of words and the question of their correctness to the recognition of the matter. Gadamer: This is obviously what Plato alone is concerned with. Gadamer I 414 The handling of the matter at issue here is the revelation of the thing meant. The word is correct when it brings the thing to the point of representation, that is, when it is a representation (mimesis). Now, it is certainly not an imitative representation in the sense of a direct depiction, so that the phonetic or visible appearance would be depicted, but it is the being (ousia), that which is appreciated by the designation to be (einai), which is to be made manifest by the word. Gadamer: But the question is whether the terms used in the conversation, the terms of mimema or deloma understood as mimema, are correct. It is certainly in the nature of mimema that something other than what it represents itself is also represented in it. Mere imitation, "to be like", therefore always contains the possibility for reflection on the distance of being between imitation and model. Neither true nor false/Cratylos: [Cratylos] is quite right when he says that as far as a word is a word, it must be "right", a correctly "lying" (here: to lie down) one. If it is not, that is, if it has no meaning, then it is a mere sounding ore(8). There is really no point in speaking of "wrong" in such a case. ((s) Cf. >Truth value gap). 1. This is the meaning of the difficult exposition of 343 c d, for which the deniers of the authenticity of the 7th letter must accept a second, nameless Plato. (Cf. my detailed presentation "Dialectic and Sophism" in the VII Platonic Letter (vol. 6 of the Ges. Werke, pp. 90-115).21. Krat. 384 d. 3. Krat. 388 c. 4. Krat. 438 d-439 b. 5. Krat. 385 b, 387 c. 6. Krat. 432 a ff. 7. Krat. 434 e. 8. Krat. 429 loc, 430 a._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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> Counter arguments against Plato
> Counter arguments in relation to Correctness
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-23