Schwarz I 69
Facts as abstra">
|Possible World: entity that can be quantified over. There ist a dispute over the question whether possible worlds exist or are only assumed for purposes of proofs of completeness. See also actual world, modal logic, modal realism, realism, actualism, possibility, possibilia, quantification._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Schwarz I 68
Def Possible worlds/Plantinga:d defines as maximum possible facts. ("magic ersatzism")
Schwarz I 69
Facts as abstract entities about whose structure not much can be said. At any case, they are no real universes or constructions of real things.
Existence/"existence"/Plantinga: (>"there is"): is a fundamental property that cannot be further analyzed. Other facts do not exist, but could exist.
Def maximum/Subject/Plantinga: a fact is maximum if its existence implies either its existence or non-existence for any other fact.
Possible worlds/Plantinga: are maximum possible facts. For example, that "in" a world donkeys can speak means that donkeys could speak if the facts had the property of existence.
VsPlantinga: this connection between a primitive property of abstract entities and the existence of talking donkeys must be accepted as inexplicable. In particular, it has nothing to do with the internal structure or composition of the abstract entity: it contains neither a talking donkey nor a picture or model of a donkey, nor a sentence or sign that somehow represents talking donkeys.
1. Why can't this abstract entity have that primitive quality even though there are no talking donkeys? Why this necessary relationship between distinct entities?
Plantinga's facts make it impossible to reduce modal truths to truth about what things with what qualities exist. Plantinga thus presupposes modality in the characterization of worlds. ((Lewis 1986e(1),§3,4)
2. Plantingas states of affairs make it impossible to reduce modal truths to truth about what things with what properties exist. Plantinga thus already assumes modality in the characterization of worlds.
3. We also want to talk not only about worlds, but also about their inhabitants. Plantinga must accept Sherlock Holmes as an irreducible abstract entity. (Plantinga 1976(2),262, 272). This is a non-qualitative (haecceitistic) property that is necessarily instantiated by an object x exactly when x is Holmes. So if in modal realism we have countless merely possible things, then in Plantinga we have countless entities of merely possible things.
1. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
2. Alvin Plantinga 1976]: “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42: 139–160. In [Loux 1979]_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005