|Cognition: cognition means processing of information by a human, animal or artificial system. Since information flows through all perceptual organs, uniform processing is to be assumed only on the lowest level of symbols. Examples of cognition are perception, learning, speech recognition, problem solving. Cognitions can run unconsciously._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
David Papineau on Cognition - Dictionary of Arguments
Cognition/space/spatial orientation/content/animal/Papineau: many birds and insects do not have egocentric maps of their environments. Nevertheless, this is not necessary purpose-means-thinking. It depends on how they use these maps!
For example, they might just simply draw a straight line from their respective position to the destination, which would not be purpose-means-thinking.
For example, it would be purpose-means-thinking if they were to use cognition to imagine a continuous path, which avoids all obstacles, from their initial position within the non-egocentric map, and then decide to take this path. This would be a combination of causal individual information._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
"The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005
The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004