|Generality: refers to properties that are shared by multiple objects._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon:
|David Papineau Die Evolution des Zweck Mittel Denkens in D. Perler, M. Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005
Perler I 255
Generality/Animal/Thinking/Papineau: no simple organism explicitly represents general facts. E.g. it is one thing to represent the location of a particular pond, that water is in ponds is quite another matter. This corresponds to the question: which animals can have beliefs?
Purpose-means-thinking/Papineau: I have not defined this concept in terms of beliefs but of design: as the use of general representations. I avoid the concept belief.
Representation/Papineau: why should an animal have no general representations?
After all, it has this disposition right now, because its behavior in the past has led to this result.
Disposition/Representation/Papineau: should the disposition itself not be regarded as the incarnation of the general information "Drinking supplies water"?
I do not want to dispute such content attribution. The disposition represents information about the general "connection of reaction with result" (B&T, V>R).
Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: if it requires explicit representations, it no longer follows that simple creatures can be considered ZM thinkers.
Explicit representation requires physical tangibility.
Vs: all behavioral dispositions must have some kind of physical embodiment.
Explicit/implicit: if an organism has implicitly different pieces of general information in different dispositions ("water is in ponds"), it still has no system to combine them._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005