Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Acts of will: A. The expression is sometimes used to characterize an action and to be distinguished from others, e.g. unconscious actions. B. In attempting to describe inner processes, some authors consider acts of will as events that precede an action. Here, other authors argue that there is a risk of regress if an act of will is to be assumed again in order to form an act of will. C. The expression act of will may be used to more accurately determine the formation of a mental state in experiments, e.g. in the experiments of B. Libet. See also will, free will, actions, consciousness, unconscious.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Danto III 136
Will/Nietzsche/Danto: If it is true that Nietzsche tries to escape the usual distinction between mental and material, then the will to power must seem contradictory. After all, "will" is an expression concerning the mental. (See Causality/Nietzsche, I, Ego, Self/Nietzsche, Subject/Nietzsche).
Danto: That is not true. As with Schopenhauer, we have to combine connotations in Nietzsche concerning the usual and mental with the concept of "will" in the metaphysical sense. The will to power is not limited to the mental. If we do not respect this, we cannot understand Nietzsche.
NietzscheVsActs of Will: Nietzsche attacks the "Acts of Will", which are not only accepted by philosophers.
Danto III 137
Acts of Will/Danto: behave to actions like causes to effects.
Hume/Danto: Hume rejected the idea that we could have an experience that corresponds to our idea of the causal nexus, how our will becomes active through our body parts or thoughts.
Hume: we have absolutely no idea how the will works. Nevertheless, Hume accepts acts of will.
NietzscheVsHume: is more radial, there is simply nothing that can be proven to be linked to our actions.
Danto III 138
Thinking/Certainty/Subject/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche disproves the Cartesian thought that our own mental processes are immediately transparent to us, that we know about our way of thinking. He disproves it by setting up a series of interlinked thoughts and letting them "freeze":
When Descartes talks about his doubts about reality being at least certainly his own doubts, he drags a lot of tacit assumptions with him.
NietzscheVsDescartes: if his argumentation boils down to an "It is thought", our belief in the concept of substance is already assumed and a subject is accepted. (F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 577).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-08-11
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