|Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Cresswell I 67
Proposition/Cresswell: there are certainly semantics that accept propositions as basic entities and attribute them as values to sentences (Montague, 1974, 227, and Cresswell, 1966).
(Also Thomason, 1980).
Sentence functor/Montague/Thomason: in such theories the
meaning of the sentence functor is: a function of propositions on propositions,
of predicates: functions of individuals on propositions, etc.
Thus, the generation property is obtained for all sentences.
Situational Semantics/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: it is not certain whether Barwise and Perry can accept this - at least not, if the meaning of each sentence operator (and when expanding each modifier) must be represented by a function. For they must have infinite domains, and the two do not want infinite entities in the semantics (> Cresswell 1985b 210f, 215f)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984