|Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Frank I 448
He/Quantification/Perry: can be quantified under certain circumstances:
Someone came when I was not home, and he brought back my book.
If Arthur comes too late, he will call.
Frank I 449
There is an x, so that x = Arthur, and if x comes late, x will call.
Easier: Like Montague:
Names/Montague: names are something that can bind variables: E.g.
If Arthur x is late, x will call.
John Perry (198]a): Castaneda on He and I, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),
15-39_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994