Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
Frank I 448
He/Quantification/Perry: can be quantified under certain circumstances:
Someone came when I was not home, and he brought back my book.
If Arthur comes too late, he will call.
Frank I 449
There is an x, so that x = Arthur, and if x comes late, x will call.
Easier: Like Montague:
Names/Montague: names are something that can bind variables: E.g.
If Arthur x is late, x will call.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

> Counter arguments against Montague

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-30