Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Reason, philosophy: reason (German “Vernunft”, prudence) is the ability to get insight. The concept of reason in this sense is distinguished in the German Idealism from the concept of reason in the sense of “Verstand” (subtlety), whereby the latter refers to the recognition of regularities and differences and the former refers to the justification of principles which are the basis of the regularities. See also mind, spirit, idealism.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Münch III 125
Everyday reason/everyday problems/MinskyVsAristotle: rather logical approaches do not work. Syllogisms cannot deal with everyday complexity when solving problems.
Axioms: "One does not go undressed out of the house", etc.
Since logicians are not concerned with systems that can be extended later, they must design axioms that allow only permitted conclusions.
This is different with intelligence.


Marvin Minsky, “A framework for representing knowledge” in: John Haugeland (Ed) Mind, design, Montgomery 1981, pp. 95-128


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Minsk I
Marvin Minsky
The Society of Mind New York 1988

Minsk II
Marvin Minsky
Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-02-21
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