Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 6
Signs/Millikan: I will set up a general drawing theory based on the Fregean sense but in the sense of Peirce, so that conventional signs, but also thoughts are covered.
This has an important consequence:
Meaning/Sense/Millikan: sense is the basic intentional or semantic characteristic, but it is not reference and also not an intension. It is not even determined by intension! Therefore, there is an epistemological problem of intentionality:
Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: we cannot a priori know what we think! Because the meaning is not defined by reference! This provides support for realism.
Given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of knowledge theory.
VsCorrespondence theory: this also rejects the correspondence theory...
I 7
...not only as a "test for truth" but also as a "nature of truth".
In any case, according to a popular point of view. But this is not without paradoxes.
Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the abilities of a knowing person are a product nature, as the knowing person itself. Knowledge must be something that one does in the world. It is a natural relation to the world.
I 70
Signs/Conventional/Millikan: conventional signs are normally used without consideration.
Convention: what makes conventional signs conventional is that they have an eigenfunction, which is independent of the particular use.
I 126
Sign/Millikan: each sign is either intentional or not intentional. Only if it is intentional, it is true/false.
Intentionality/Millikan: intentionality allows gradations.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-21