Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 252
Reliability/Knowledge/Thinking/Millikan: Thesis: to know what I think is to have a program in me that can carry out the correct acts of identification, of the referents of my current thought-token.
Gradual: how good I am is gradual and depends on my dexterity and reliability. This helps me when I know a lot about the object. Thereby, repititions of the name of the thing are earlier acts of identification, and thus more intensions that facilitate my access to the thing.
Problem: these intensions themselves must also be reliable.
I 253
Intension/Millikan. The intensions which I have of an object must also have had occasion to be applied.
For example, "My great grandfather on my father's side a hundred generations before me" is a definite description, but hardly tangible as an intension. Therefore it may be that I do not know what object I think of.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

> Counter arguments against Millikan
> Counter arguments in relation to Reliability Theory

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25