|Aboutness, being about philosophy: The context in which this expression occurs is the reference to a linguistic expression on something beyond its linguistic level. The being-about-something makes a decisive step that distinguishes objects from everything else. Objects cannot be about something. In this sense, also individual words are to be understood as objects. In a wider sense, actions can also be about something. See also intentionality, intentions, reference, self-reference, levels, description levels, pointing, circularity, subsententials._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Intentionality/about/aboutness/MillikanVsTradition: Intentionality is not transparent: many processes that are "about" something in the sense that their users are not aware of them.
E.g. von Frisch knew what a bee dance is about, the bees do not know. Bees react only appropriately to bee dances.
Thought: requires that the referent is identified._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005