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Sense/Millikan: sense is the basic intentional or semantic feature, but it is not a reference and also not an intension. It is not even determined by intension! Therefore, there is an epistemological problem of intentionality:
Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: we cannot a priori know what we think! Because the meaning is not defined by reference! This provides support for realism.
Given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of epistemology.
VsCorrespondence theory: this also rejects the correspondence theory...
...not only as a "test for truth" but also as a "nature of truth".
In any case, according to a popular point of view. But this is not without paradoxes.
Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the abilities of a knowing person are a product of nature, as the knowing person itself. Knowledge must be something that one does in the world. It is a natural relation to the world.
Sense/Meaning/Millikan: sense is not "intension": and also not Quinean "meaning". Also not Fregean sense.
Intension/Millikan: intension has to do with a network of concluding rules.
Sense: has taken over the task of "intension", but sense is not completely in contrast with "referent".
Reference: having a referent will be the same as having "sense".
Referents: are another thing.
Definition sense/sense/intentional icons/Fregean sense/Millikan: an intentional icon has sense and each of the variable and invariant mapping elements or aspects also have sense. Also every element of a family of such an element has sense.
Having sense: corresponds to having normal conditions for the exercise of the direct eigenfunction.
Definition sense/sense/Fregean sense/short/Millikan: is the normal mapping rule. The sense of an icon are the rules according to which the icon maps something.
1. Neither stimulus meaning nor explicit intension (if any is present) determine the sense.
2. The sense determines neither the stimulus meaning nor the explicit intension (if there is one).
3. Expressions in the idiolect can therefore have different stimulus meanings and/or intensions, and still have the same meaning. Even the same stimulus meaning and/or intension and different senses.
4. Neither stimulus meaning nor intension are infallible. They do not need that because they are not "criteria". For the referent nothing depends on them.
5. Senses - also of thoughts - can be ambiguous and also empty.
6. A term in the idiolect can have multiple intensions and yet have a clear meaning.
7. Sense: an expression is not the same as the sense of one of the explicit intensions.
8. The sense of an expression can be ambiguous or empty, and yet its explicit intension can have a clear meaning.
9. If one can say that an empty term has a meaning (somehow related to intentionality), then only because it has an intension that makes sense on its part. Sense, not intension is the root of all intentionality, intension is only secondary "meaning".
10. It may be that one has two expressions in the idiolect but does not know that they have the same meaning, for example, Hesperus/Phosphorus. That is, knowledge of the synonymy in an idiolect is not knowledge a priori. Knowledge of the ambiguity of the Fregean sense is also no knowledge a priori.
Sense/Complex/Complexity/composed/Expression/Millikan/(s): to have sense, an expression must be composed ((s) in a predication).
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987