Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Correctness, Logik: is a property of systems or calculi, not of conclusions. A system is correct when all the statements provable in it are true. The system is complete when all valid statements in it are also provable. Completeness and correctness are complementary; they are complementing each other to adequacy. (R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Philosophische Logik, Paderborn, 2002).
B. Correctness, accuracy, philosophy contrary to the concept of truth, the concept of accuracy refers to an implicitly or explicitly presupposed rule system, which is fulfilled or not fulfilled. While truth is something that is attributed or denied to sentences, accuracy is rather applied to actions - also verbal acting - as well as to illustrations. Unlike truth, accuracy allows gradations. See also truth, truth conditions, indeterminacy, systems, theory, fulfillment, satisfiability._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ruth Millikan on Correctness - Dictionary of Arguments
I 308 Truth/correctness/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine, a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how is learning, speaking in unison, supposed to facilitate the prediction? >Learning, >Prediction, >Judgment, >Stimulus. Consensus/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both do not take into account what consistency in judgments actually is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, it does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: Consensus means saying the same about the same. Discrepancy: can only occur if sentences have a subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine even goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" As a sentence. He claims the difference between the word and the sentence affects only the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proved by the absence of evidence, but by positive facts (see above). >Sentence, >Negation, >Fact. Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree with a sentence and its negation at the same time, lies in nature (natural necessity). >Contradiction. I 309 Thesis: the lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. Consensus/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they ignore the importance of consistency in the judgment. Consensus: this is not about the fact that two people come together, but that they come together with the world. Consensus/discrepancy/Millikan: are not two equivalent possibilities ((s) >inegalitarian theories/Nozick). There are much more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong than for the same sentence to be true. Now, if a whole pattern (system) of matching judgments appears, mapping the same area (e.g. color), the probability that each participant maps an area outside in the world is vast. E.g. just because my judgments about the timing almost always coincide with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to sort my memories correctly into the time sequence. Objectivity/Time/Perspective/Media/Communication/Millikan: Thesis: the medium that other people form with their utterances is for me the most accessible perspective I can have in terms of time. >Objectivity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Millikan
> Counter arguments in relation to Correctness
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-17