Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Ruth Millikan on Descriptions - Dictionary of Arguments
I 175 Description/Millikan: we are here to find out what the stabilization function of definite and indefinite descriptions is. >Terminology/Millikan. We have to go on our own. We cannot rely on the tradition of Russell-Trawson-Donnellan. Reference/MillikanVsStrawson: we must assume that it is not just speakers who are referring, but we must assume that the linguistic expressions themselves also refer. I 176 Indefinite description/real value/Millikan: The real value is determined by the rest of the sentence, not by the indefinite description itself. I 177 Reference: is something different than an image! Indefinite description: maps, but without referring! Inner name: it is not the task of an indefinite desription to be translated into an inner name. Their normal eigenfunction is to be translated into an inner description, which still contains a general expression. I 178 Indefinite description: an indefinite description as a whole, is not a referential term. Tradition: has assumed however e.g. "an Indian friend of mine gave me this". Here I think of Rakesh. MillikanVsTradition: this leads to confusion. I leave the referent open on purpose. Reference: it is certainly true that I intended Rakesh, so I will also refer to him. N.B.: if Rakesh asks me later: "Did you tell them about me?" The correct answer is "No!". Eigenfunction/Descripion/Millikan: the eigenunction is not here to be translated into an inner name for Rakesh. On the other hand: Natural sign: is causally dependent. And the identification was finally caused by Rakesh, who gave me the book. >Identification, >Reference. I 179 Causality/description/real value/Millikan: The causal connection of an intentional icon with its real value makes it possible for the listener to use it as a natural sign. >Causality, >Causal theory of knowledge. N.B.: thus a new inner name can be coined. ((s) Not an already existing inner name). Definition "natural referent"/indefinite description/Terminology/Millikan: any indefinite description has a real value in accordance with a normal explanation, the "natural referents". This also applies to stories (fiction). But this is not a public reference. Here, causality and mapping rules do not matter. >Fiction. Public referent/Millikan: a definite description or name can have (by chance) a public referent, without having a natural referent. Therefore an indefinite description can have a natural one without having a public one. I 181 Real value/definite descripion/Millikan: the real value of a definite description is determined by the rest of the sentence. E.g.: Which of my friends was it? The one who gave me the book. I 185 Description/Millikan. E.g. "my brother" is neither definite nor indefinite. I can use the description if I have one or more brothers._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |