Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 94
Mistake/Falsehood/False/Error/Deception/Naturalistic fallacy/Millikan: nothing can be described as broken by looking at only this single, isolated thing.
Normality/solution: it is always about how a thing "is supposed to be".
Problem: also false beliefs and false sentences do not show for themselves alone that they are wrong. Even senseless sentences do not show their senselessness in themselves.
Rationalism/MillikanVsRationalism: rationalism must therefore be false in relation to intentionality.
MillicanVsDescartes: Cartesian reflection alone does not even show the intentional character of our beliefs and ideas.
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I 171
Error/Deception/Showing/index word/Millikan: e.g. there are two items on the table, an ashtray that I do not consider an ashtray, and a thing that is not an ashtray, but I think that it is an ahstray and say: "this is a nice ashtray".
Question: Did I say with this that the ashtray is beautiful, even though I meant the other object?
E.g. I hold up a book and say "This belonged to my grandfather". I am wrong, however, and hold up the wrong book.
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I 172
What I said is, of course, wrong. Not so clear is whether what I have meant is something different than what I said.
Millikan: Thesis: here it is not the case that I and my token of "this" meant different things.
Solution: "this" is ambiguous in relation to the Fregean sense.
MillikanVsTradition: philosophers have often neglected this.
Solution/Millikan: perception can lead to temporary concepts in us.
Temporary concepts/intensions/Millikan: Intensions are then tied to our abilities to trace and reidentify things.
Provisional concept: e.g. this coffee cup is for me completely indistinguishable from a dozen others, but at the moment it is my cup.
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I 173
Question: Does this even count as a concept? The ability to trace the object leads to an inner concept. This leads to the distinction between perception and thought.
Thinking/Millikan: when thinking is not mediated by perception, the objects you think of are not indexed.
Perception: here the objects are indexed.
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I 174
Error/Deception/Index Word/Perception/Misidentification/Millikan: E.g. Suppose I am wrong when I identify a recurring object. Then my inner concept has two senses, it has an ambiguous Fregean sense.
1. derived sense from the ability to trace the object
2. inner concept which I already had before
"This" is ambiguous.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-22