Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Errors: An error is a deviation from accuracy or correctness. It can be a mistake in action, speech, or belief. Errors can be caused by human mistakes, computer faults, and incorrect measurement. See also Knoiwledge, Correctness, Confirmation, Falsification, Measurements, Observation, Certainty._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ruth Millikan on Errors - Dictionary of Arguments
I 94 Mistake/Falsehood/False/Error/Deception/Naturalistic fallacy/Millikan: nothing can be described as broken by looking at only this single, isolated thing. Normality/solution: it is always about how a thing "is supposed to be". Problem: also false beliefs and false sentences do not show for themselves alone that they are wrong. Even senseless sentences do not show their senselessness in themselves. >Context dependence. Rationalism/MillikanVsRationalism: rationalism must therefore be false in relation to intentionality. MillicanVsDescartes: Cartesian reflection alone does not even show the intentional character of our beliefs and ideas. >Rationalism. I 171 Error/Deception/Showing/index word/Millikan: e.g. there are two items on the table, an ashtray that I do not consider an ashtray, and a thing that is not an ashtray, but I think that it is an ahstray and say: "this is a nice ashtray". Question: Did I say with this that the ashtray is beautiful, even though I meant the other object? E.g. I hold up a book and say "This belonged to my grandfather". I am wrong, however, and hold up the wrong book. I 172 What I said is, of course, wrong. Not so clear is whether what I have meant is something different than what I said. Millikan: Thesis: here it is not the case that I and my token of "this" meant different things. Solution: "this" is ambiguous in relation to the Fregean sense. >Fregean sense, >Ambiguity. MillikanVsTradition: philosophers have often neglected this. Solution/Millikan: perception can lead to temporary concepts in us. Temporary concepts/intensions/Millikan: Intensions are then tied to our abilities to trace and reidentify things. Provisional concept: e.g. this coffee cup is for me completely indistinguishable from a dozen others, but at the moment it is my cup. I 173 Question: Does this even count as a concept? The ability to trace the object leads to an inner concept. This leads to the distinction between perception and thought. Thinking/Millikan: when thinking is not mediated by perception, the objects you think of are not indexed. Perception: here the objects are indexed. >Perception, >Indexicality. I 174 Error/Deception/Index Word/Perception/Misidentification/Millikan: E.g. Suppose I am wrong when I identify a recurring object. Then my inner concept has two senses, it has an ambiguous Fregean sense. 1. derived sense from the ability to trace the object 2. inner concept which I already had before "This" is ambiguous. >Index words._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16