|Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefrom, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Belief/wishes/intension/Millikan: can be explained without reference to language.
Intension/Millikan: intension is something quite different from Fregean sense. It is not a rule, but an application criterion, relative to the speaker's state. We must take into account the speaker and his mechanisms. Its dispositions and its justification for the use of an icon.
Intension: has therefore to do with causation and justification of utterances.
Sense/Fregean Sense/Millikan: sense has nothing to do with the particular speaker and his situation, one does not have to know how he comes to map something, just how something is mapped.
Meaning/Intension/Millikan: Difference: e.g. Pegasus: has an intension, but as an empty name it can have no (Fregean) sense.
Adjective: correspondingly: "bewitched" has no sense, but intension.
Intension/Concept/Language/Quine/Millikan: our concepts cannot be based on intensions, and these in turn on other intensions etc.
Intrusive information/Quine: then we would be dealing with "intrusive information".
Quine: everything would always have to be tested at once._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987