|Thought, philosophy: a thought corresponds to a complete sentence. There is debate about whether we can attribute such thoughts to animals. See also mentalism, mental states, opacity, thinking, reality, world/thinking, propositional attitudes, propositions, intensions, objects of thought, relation theory, mentalese, computation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Thoughts: so this is about knowledge-what.
Classical realism: thinking and knowledge are separated for classical realism, and intentionality is transparent.
Intentionality/about/aboutness/MillikanVsTradition: Intentionality is not transparent: many processes that are "about" something are not aware of their users.
E.g. von Frisch knew what a bee dance is, the bees do not know. Bees react only appropriately to bee dances.
Thought: requires that the referent is identified.
Inference: involves acts of identification of what the thoughts are about. That is why they are representations.
Grasp/Millikan: what is it for a thinker to grasp what his thought is about?
Millikan: it is the ability to identify the referent of his thought with the referent of elements of other intentional icons._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987