|Introduction, philosophy: the introduction of objects establishes rules for the use of linguistic expressions for the objects, not a determination or description of these objects. See also definitions, use, language, expressiveness, localization._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
New words/novelty/introduction/Millikan: the newly introduced word has an eigenfunction which is derived not only from the speaker's intentions, but also from the public stabilization function of the introduction. As such, it has a public significance.
Introduction/Conviction/Belief/Intentional Icon/Millikan: 1. People have mechanisms - "consistency testers" - who test the consistency of their sentences.
2. Syntactic forms are produced by programs that are tested themselves.
Problem: we must show why a sentence should be an intentional icon. The key will be to find an eigenfunction...
...for each sentence used by the consistency testers as a standard.
Ad 1. Assume that a token is repeated and has survived, is recognized, and acquires an eigenfunction. The fact that it passes the text, helps to stabilize itself. If all aspects of a sentence are elements of families, the sentence as a whole must meet condition 1.
Ad 2. the consistency-tester distinguishes between pairs of sentences that are a) contradictions, b) say the same, c) are neither contradictions, nor say the same.
For this, the author has to recognize the sentences that say the same, and recognize negation as a negation.
New words: must be new due to the phonetic structure.
Tester: must be genetically programmed to invent new words.
New words and testers are designed to fit together.
New programs: are only good when they help to produce sentences according to rules that have reasons. The reasons must mention the conditions under which they often work, and they must also mention laws of nature that connect sentences with what is mapped.
Information: in this way sentences must transport information. (> Dretske: Knowledge and the Flow of Information).
Solution: the consistency tester does this by comparing sentences produced by other programs with a sentence S. If S performs an eigenfunction according to the same mapping function, the consistency tester adapts to the conditions in the world so that it can now test these other programs!
N.B.: hence S is an intentional icon.
Introduction/Referent/definite description/inner name/Millikan: If you translate a description into an inner name, must it be one that already exists, or can it be coined newly? For the moment, it is enough to distinguish these two possibilities.
Terminology/Millikan: we then speak of "old" and "new" referents.
Inner name/definite description/Millikan: The inner name used by the listener for the definite description must be governed by a concept.
E.g. I have a concept of the members of my family. ((s) "concept" instead of "idea").
Introduction/Identifying/Identification/Description/Millikan: a description that (by chance) introduces a referent does not express this by itself.
Necessarily identifying: a necessarily identifying description, however, expresses that it is identifying. ((s) self-reference: is something else than expressing its own function in the execution).
Introduction/Novelty/New/Millikan: When we introduce a whole new expression with referencing quotes, we refer to a reproductively determined family. In addition, the new symbol should at least in part consist of already known elements or aspects. Otherwise, the token does not fall within any schema equal/different, which is necessary to recognize the progeny of this expression (tokens of the same type)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987