Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Attributive/referential: difference in reference - attributive "whoever it is" (may not be identified) - referential the identified object.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 215
Descriptive/Referential/Description/Classification/Millikan: one can force a descriptive description to function referentially, e.g. "He said that the winner was the loser". E.g. (Russell): "I thought your yacht was bigger than it is."
I 216
Solution: "the winner", and "bigger than your yacht" must be considered as classified according to the adapted meaning.
On the other hand:
"The loser": probably has only descriptive meaning.
"Your yacht": is classified by both: by adapted and by relational meaning, only "your" is purely referential.
Quine: (classic example) E.g.: "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras lies in Nicaragua".
MillikanVsQuine: this is not, as Quine believes, obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational meaning in this context.
Referential/descriptive/Belief attribution/intentional/Millikan: There are exceptions where the expressions are not descriptive, but also do not function purely referential, but also through relational meaning or intension.
For example, "the man who drove us home" is someone who is well known to the speaker and listener. Then the listener has to assume that someone else is meant because the name is not needed.
Rule: here the second half of the rule is violated for intentional contexts, "inserted any expression that receives the reference".
This is often a sign that the first half is injured: "a sign has not only reference, but also meaning or intension, which must be preserved. Why would you use such a cumbersome description ("the man who drove us home") instead of the name?

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-06-25
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