|Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation.|
Books on Amazon
|Cavell I 45
Pain/Numerical Identity/Qualitative Identity/Malcolm: Malcolm disputes the fact that one can reasonably say in (descriptive) identical painful occurrences that it is two. Thesis: with regard to sensory impressions, the concept of "numerical identity" has no application.
Malcolm: if the description is the same, there cannot be the additional question whether the idea would also be the same.
Cavell I 55
Identity/numeric/qualitative/Malcolm: in sensations, we must invent a criterion! E.g. Siamese twins with one hand: here you have to decide if there is one pain or two.
Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Harper Essays in Philosophy) 1971
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002