|Substance, philosophy: in the philosophical discussion, the substance is the assumed, not-determined, equilibrium, which is the basis of the changing forms or accidents of the objects. See also ousia, accidents, substratum._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Holz I 90
Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the first and necessary being seems merely to correspond to the substance of Spinoza. In reality, it is only the concept of the totality of the inner-world facts.
The notion of the being experienced includes the concept of a true totality.
If, therefore, something is, then also is the one being of all beings and not nothing.
Holz I 112
Substance/Causality/Leibniz: Substance does not require causal action because its state is "by itself" (according to its own nature) in correspondence with the states of other substances.
Their autonomy is based on the fact that, in absolute world immobility, they represent nothing more than the particular perspectively realized isomorphism of the individual and the whole.
The individual is what it is only by the fact that the whole of the world is the necessary and sufficient condition of its individual being. That's why there is no need for windows.
It is not initiated from the outside, because that would be something outside the world then.
The individual is always a manifestation of the whole (>Mach's principle)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992