|Justification, philosophy: justification is a condition for knowledge which a) is fulfilled or not fulfilled by the explanation of the origin of the information or b) by a logical examination of the argument. For a), theories such as the causal theory of knowledge or reliability theories have been developed. See also verification, examination, verification, proofs, externalism.|
Justification in a broader sense is a statement about the occurrence of an action or a choice. See also explanations, ultimate justification, reasons._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
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|Holz I 68
Truths of facts/Leibniz: here, too, the proposition of the sufficient reason should apply, although truths of reason do not come into play here.
Here the "also" is important: it states something about the logical status of truths of facts as a kind of truth of reason.
Truths of facts/Leibniz: are now distinguished from truths of reason as their opposite! (Namely, as not logically justifiable). > Sufficient -> reasons,> truth,> principles.
Holz I 69
Definition "Golden Chain" of the links/Holz: metaphor of the baroque. "Aura catena": if one is defined by its relation to another, then the totality of the elements is the reason of this one.
Chain/Leibniz: more than temporal: one is respectively more determined by its closer neighbor.
Sufficient justification/Leibniz: something can be adequately justified by its connection with its nearest neighbors, but not completely.
Complete justification/reason/determination/Leibniz: only through the whole chain. (infinite, only to be seen by God).
The individual terms would have to be given by identical sentences._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992