|Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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|Holz I 40
Necessity/Leibniz: ultimately, the insight (that is, through the use of the definition instead of the defined) arises from the seen concepts that they are necessary or that they imply a contradiction.
Holz I 72
Existence/Necessity/Identity/Being/Leibniz: the sentences
"The being is" and
"Only one being is necessary"
stand in a very specific follow-up ratio:
The sentence "the being is" is an identical proposition, i.e. its opposite is contradictory.
Thus existential and copulative (copula) use of "is" coincide here.
One could also say "being is being" in order to make clear that the predicate is necessary for the subject. But:
For example, "the stone is a being stone": this sentence is not identical, the being does not necessarily belong to the stone! The stone could only be thought of. Therefore, we need perception to be convinced of the existence.
But this is not only true of bodies, but also of general things, e.g. the genus human, it does not exist neccessarily.
The necessity of existence is valid only by the world as a whole.
Holz I 78
Intension/Extension/Leibniz/Holz: The necessity of the totality of the world is not the modal aspect of the extensionality (or statement form, according to which a predicate is assigned to a subject), but the intensional necessity or materiality according to which the predicate is inherent in the subject._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992